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The Teaching of (Another) International Law:  





In this article I explore the potential of a critical realist approach to the teaching of 
international law. Critical realist scholars have advanced a compelling account of the 
importance of paying attention – in designing educational curricula, delivering 
materials and classroom interactions – to the close relationship between agency and 
structure, a relationship that has also come to preoccupy international legal scholars. 
Recent academic work, especially that developed by critical international legal 
scholars, has revealed and insisted upon the structural dimension of the international 
legal order. According to these scholars, this dimension should be taken into account in 
order to explain and challenge some of the ways in which international law has 
historically constituted, and continues to constitute, our persistently violent and unequal 
material and social world at all levels, from international to local spaces, and from 
collective to individual subjectivities. If the aim is to generate another global order, and 
another international law, teaching international law today requires us to learn how to 
negotiate the structure and agency divide. The work of critical realists has the potential 
to help teachers of international law create a more emancipatory learning experience 
for their students in order to face this crucial task. 
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[T]hings can be, and quite frequently are,  





Over the past three decades, researchers of adult education associated with the school 
of thought known as ‘critical realism’ have paid increasing attention to the close 
relationship between agency and structure. The object of these discussions, and of the 
scholarship that has emerged from them, has been to think more precisely about how 
higher education curricula should be conceived, designed and delivered.2 For critical 
realists, curricula ought to reflect and challenge the nature of knowledge in our world: 
a world already ‘structured’ by conflicting truth claims and by inherited material 
asymmetries. At the same time, critical realists argue that such curricula should pay 
attention to the specificities of learners’ socio-economic, geographic and cultural 
backgrounds because these ‘standpoints’ inform and shape their sense of ‘agency’ and 
hence the nature of their interaction with the world.3 On this basis, critical realists argue 
that a ‘genuinely educational curriculum’ must be cognisant of the close interaction 
between structure and agency, and should aim to bringing into being ‘a transformative 
set of relations’ both within the classroom itself and, later on, out in the world.4 The 
university is therefore viewed as a ‘mediating link’ between accepted truths and the 
structures that those truths support on the one hand, and students’ own experiences and 
positionality vis-à-vis those structures on the other.5 At the core of this approach is a 
call for teachers to enable a learning environment in which students’ agentic 
                                               
1 S. Marks, ‘False Contingency’ (2009) 62(1) Current Legal Problems 1, 2. 
2 For an overview of critical realism, see: M. Archer, Critical Realism: Essential Readings (Taylor and 
Francis, 2013). On critical realism and education, see: D. Scott, Education, Epistemology and Critical 
Realism (Taylor and Francis, 2013). 
3 On the importance of problematising knowledge and learning in education and educational research, 
particularly in terms of truth claims, the function of education and learners’ backgrounds, see: T. Haggis, 
‘Knowledge must be contextual: Some possible implications for complexity and dynamic systems 
theories for educational research’ (2008) 40(1) Educational Philosophy and Theory; P. Kelly, C. Hickey, 
and R. Tinning, ‘Educational Truth Telling in a More Reflexive Modernity’ (2010) 21(1) British Journal 
of Sociology of Education; D. Bridges, ‘Educational Research: pursuit of truth or flight into fancy?’ 
(1999) 25(9) British Educational Research Journal. 
4 G. Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity in sociology of education’ (2014) 
35(2) British Journal of Sociology of Education 167, 181. 
5 Ibid. 
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possibilities are strengthened in awareness of – instead of despite – those structures that 
are already shaping their lives.6 
 
In this article I engage with critical realist literature on the subject of adult education in 
order to explore its value for the teaching of international law. In my discussion of this 
literature, I first pay attention to the way in which critical realists have come to 
conceptualise ‘agency’ and ‘structure’. In their attention to both agency and structure, 
and in connection with other strands of critical thinking, critical realists have recovered 
a structuralist approach to social reality, human relations and world historical processes. 
This approach had been side-lined by an overpowering focus on agency-based analyses 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century, a focus still prevalent in many areas of 
the social sciences, the humanities and other fields.7 After this discussion of critical 
realism’s disruptive entrance into teaching and educational research, and the value of 
that disruption, I then review how critical realists have come to mediate the interaction 
between agency and structure in their quest to offer a more emancipatory higher 
educational experience. In the last section, I concentrate on the importance of a critical 
realist approach for the teaching of international law. I conclude with some preliminary 
thoughts based on my own experience as a teacher of international law, specifically 
how much I have gained from thinking anew about the interplay between structure and 
agency in my syllabi and teaching, with the help of critical realism. 
 
As I explain below, recent critical scholars of international law have also come to insist 
upon the structural dimension of the international legal order. Like critical realists, our 
attention to structure has come as a response to an over-insistence on the indeterminacy 
of international law which reads individuals as essentially free agents. This latter 
reading emerged as part of the ideological battles fought during the Cold War, and was 
consolidated after 1989 as neoliberal ideas – associated with state downsizing, 
                                               
6 On how this attention to agency and structure in relation to students should be also applied to teachers’ 
practices and critical self-reflexivity, see: G. Edwards and G. Thomas, ‘Can Reflective Practice be 
Taught?’ (2010) 36(4) Educational Studies 403.  
7 On the rising predominance and effects of agency-based models of knowledge in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, see for example, G. Downey, ‘Agency and Structure in Negotiating Knowledge’ in 
M. Douglas and D. Hull (eds), How Classification Works: Nelson Goodman among the Social Sciences 
(Edinburgh University Press, 1992). On the widespread uptake of agency, narrowly understood, in the 
social sciences and the humanities during the 1990s, see for example, B. Barnes, Understanding Agency: 
Social Theory and Responsible Action (Sage, 1999).  
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privatisation and a focus on individual action – came to dominate many aspects of 
international institutional life. 8  According to critical international law scholars, in 
contrast, it is necessary to understand the structural dimensions of international law in 
order to make sense not only of the biases of the global normative and institutional 
order, but also of the way in which international law has constituted, and continues to 
constitute, our persistently violent and unequal world, from international to local 
spaces, and from collective to individual subjectivities. If our aim then is to generate 
another international law and another global order, teaching international law today 
requires us to offer an account of the field in terms of both structure and agency, echoing 
the claims made by educational researchers working in the critical realist mode. 
Without such attention to structure and agency, and to the inter-relationship between 
them, accounts of international law cannot equip students with the tools they need to 
respond actively to a world in which their individual circumstances and surroundings 
are continually being shaped and reshaped by structures historically imbedded in the 
international legal order. 
 
I. Agency, structure and their reading in critical realism 
 
Often associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar (1944–2014), critical realism, as a 
philosophical approach, is committed to rational enquiry while remaining critical of 
positivism.9 Authors working in this tradition are interested in ‘making strange’ the 
process of investigation and in reflecting on the relationship between research methods 
and research results.10 Likewise they place strong emphasis on ontological clarification, 
which translates in practice into a detailed study of the nature of being, and in particular 
of ‘being in the world’.11 Using these various interests as its starting point, critical 
                                               
8 The literature on the effects of the end of the Cold War and neoliberalism on the international legal 
order (particularly international economic law and human rights) is very extensive. For recent excellent 
overviews of this period, see for example: Q. Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of 
Neoliberalism (Harvard University Press, 2018); J. Whyte, ‘Powerless companions or fellow travellers? 
Human rights and the neoliberal assault on postcolonial economic justice’ 2(2) Radical Philosophy 13; 
J. Linarelli, M. Salomon and M. Sornarajah, The Misery of International Law: Confrontations with 
Injustice in the Global Economy (Oxford 2018), 8–18. 
9 See especially the following works by Roy Bhaskar: A Realist Theory of Science (Verso, 2nd ed, 1997 
[1975]); The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences 
(Routledge, 3rd ed, 1998 [1979]). 
10 On the idea of ‘making strange’ and ‘defamiliarization’, see: Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Device’ in 
Alexandra Berlina (ed), Viktor Shklovsky: A Reader (Bloomsbury, 2016).  
11 See: Archer, Critical Realism; Scott, Education, Epistemology and Critical Realism. 
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realism aims to achieve a degree of objectivity that is able to situate subjects of enquiry 
within the broader social world and history, moving away from unnecessary 
determinisms or paralysing uncertainties. In this way, the critical realist approach to 
philosophical reflection and social investigation is geared towards a critique that aspires 
to social change. As Richard Gunn explained in his early analysis of its relationship 
with Marxism, critical realism ‘is critical because, rightly, it refuses to take appearances 
at their face value’, and ‘it is realist because it believes that the “structures” and 
“mechanisms” which it regards as generating appearances exist not merely as 
theoretical constructs but objectively, and in practice, as well.’ 12  From this 
understanding, critical realism makes the relation between structure and agency central 
to social analysis and action. The point here is to clarify the terms and conditions of 
how to assess and possibly change complex social realities, which are always 
historically constituted and multi-layered. 
 
The return to the seemingly old, and for many out-dated, relation between agency and 
structure, particularly in the context of pedagogical debates, emerged from critical 
realist researchers’ systematic revisiting of two key themes organising both traditional 
and more critical approaches to education.13 On the one hand, critical realists have 
engaged with the question of the universality of knowledge, and of whether universal 
knowledge exists or not. For critical realists, claims of universality should be seen as 
reflecting structures that condition what becomes the truth. Paying attention to these 
structures, and teaching the knowledge that underpins them, is thus fundamental to the 
achievement of a more grounded objectivity and processes of social emancipation. On 
the other hand, critical realists have generated their own view of the contours, the 
internal and external mechanics, and the possibilities and limits, of learners’ agency. 
This understanding of agency has emerged from critical realists’ take on both the role 
that structure plays in education and the role that education should play in relation to 
structural conditions and forces. 
 
                                               
12 R. Gunn, ‘Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism’ (1989) 13(1) Capital & Class 87. 
13 On the relationship between agency and structure from a critical realist point of view in general, see: 
M. Archer, Being Human: The Problem of Agency (CUP, 2001); M. Archer, Structure, Agency and the 
Internal Conversation (CUP, 2003). 
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As just described, critical realist researchers question the possibility of the universality 
of knowledge, and with this the existence of truth or a set of truths which can be 
transmitted unproblematically through the education system. They thus advance a long 
line of critiques against positive, realist and structural-functionalist approaches to 
education. Authors working in these three modes, in particular those who are more 
orthodox, assume as the basis of the educational experience a body of ‘existing’ 
universal knowledge that has to be transmitted to students – students who are seen as 
being placed in a social order that can be described in an a priori and not necessarily 
contingent manner.14  
 
Critical realists, expanding on the work of Marxists, post-Marxists and critical social 
theorists, have argued instead that, as Michel Foucault might have put it, truth claims 
are a reflection of a particular ‘order of things’ – a particular, often naturalised, 
arrangement of power.15 For critical realists, therefore, structural arrangements and 
orderings, at the levels of both knowledge and materiality, continually inform the ideas 
that are transmitted in education and, in this way, organise the operation of our society 
as a whole. Crucially, for critical realists these structural conditions are not the sum 
total of reality or an immutable feature of it; rather, they are iterations of power. This 
means that for authors working under the banner of critical realism, social structures 
and the social order they have produced must be performed and re-performed constantly 
if they are to remain in a hegemonic position. Through this repetition, a particular world 
and particular kinds of individuals are constituted. Marcel Mauss’s classic 1934 essay 
‘Techniques of the Body’ already described the drivers and outcomes of this process. 
For Mauss ‘we are everywhere faced with physio-psycho-sociological assemblages’, 
individual assemblages that are possible ‘because they are assembled by and for social 
authority.’16 
 
Operating within this same set of concerns, Gail Edwards – in reviewing the influence 
and value of critical realism for education – explains how, for this school of thought:  
 
                                               
14 See for example: Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity’, 170–171. 
15 See for example: M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1: An Introduction (Pantheon Books, 
1978); M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage, 1994). 
16 M. Mauss, Techniques of the Body’ (1973) 2(1) Economy and Society 70, 85. 
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social activity constructs the social structure, [yet] that structure is nonetheless 
irreducible to its individual makers. There is, in other words, an autonomous 
reality of mechanisms and tendencies that acts upon agents in ways which both 
enable and constrain them, whether they are conscious of it or not.17 
 
Critical realism is, in this manner, attentive to the persistent ways in which structure 
moulds social reality, inserting specific ‘mechanisms and tendencies’ that become 
present in (among others) the educational environment. 18  Importantly, for critical 
realists, structure’s ubiquity does not prevent it from being ‘prone to partiality and 
error.’19 From this it becomes clear not only that students need ‘powerful knowledge’ 
in order to interact with the world – as claimed by authors associated with social realism 
(for example, Michael Young) 20  – but that the ideas and activities of students 
themselves also need to be understood within broader and older dynamics of power. 
These dynamics should be taken into account in the design of curricula and explained 
to students, critical realists argue, so they can encounter their world as historically 
structured in particular ways – a world which they now need to understand and change 
from their own structured position. For Kim Niewolny and Arthur Wilson, this is 
perhaps the most potent feature of critical realism. In their view, a critical realist 
approach to education has the potential for ‘expanding the theory and practice of adult 
education by enabling us to recognize how adult learners are cultural and historical 
agents embedded within and constituted by socially structured relationships and tool-
mediated activity.’21 
 
Critical realism’s understanding of structure, therefore, does not deny the possibility of 
subjects’ interaction with structural conditions, or their ability to question their own 
position within these structures via rational exploration and argumentation. Edwards is 
clear about this in her reading of the philosophical lineage and main tenets of critical 
realism in relation to education. According to Edwards: 
 
                                               
17 Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity’, 171. Emphasis in the original. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 M. Young, ‘What is a curriculum and what can it do?’ (2014) 25(1) The Curriculum Journal 7. 
21 K. L. Niewolny and A. L. Wilson, ‘What happened to the promise? A critical (re)orientation of two 
sociocultural learning traditions’ (2009) 60(1) Adult Education Quarterly 26, 27. 
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Critical realism emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century from two 
strands of thought – a critical current, emanating from Marx, Freud and 
Nietzsche, which stresses the socially constructed nature of knowledge; and a 
realist ontological current, which stresses the power of science to explain and 
predict events in the natural world.22 
 
Closely following this last point, researchers associated with critical realism have 
embraced the challenges posed by critical theory to classic assumptions of ‘subjectivity’ 
as a stable and decontextualised expression of individual will. Critical realists argue 
that learners’ subjectivity, and their approach to and ability in relation to learning, is 
informed by their life experiences and positioning within social structures. Known 
broadly as ‘standpoint theory’, this approach to subjects and their subjectivity has 
thrown doubt on the belief that learners can approach ideas and receive knowledge in 
an unmediated manner. In this way, standpoint theory has destabilised liberal 
assumptions regarding the agency of subjects, including the idea that agency is 
somehow free and that subjects are able to move on in life with little more than an 
informed education. With this destabilisation, standpoint theory has further eroded the 
sense that a universal set of instructions, principles and instruments and activities of 
learning should form the inner core of education.23 
 
In embracing standpoint theory, critical realists have come, once again, to reinforce 
contemporary suspicions about truth claims. But they have done this without making 
absolute assertions about the unintelligibility of subjects and ‘others’, thanks to their 
continuous attention to the structural underpinnings of agency’s formation and 
performance. As a result they aim to steer education and curriculum design towards 
offering knowledge that is useful for students in contexts that are, almost always, 
structurally diverse and uneven in economic, social and political terms. Authors 
working in critical realism have accordingly developed a reading of standpoint theory 
that makes something productive out of the destabilisation of subjectivity and subject 
formation triggered by the cultural/critical turn and the arrival of postmodernism in the 
1960s and 1970s. 24  Instead of approaching subjects as totally unreadable, 
                                               
22 Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity’, 171. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity’, 171–175. 
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incommensurable and radically different, critical realism accepts subjects in their 
diversity and contingency while continuing to pay attention to their structural 
positioning. With this take on standpoint theory, critical realists recuperate an earlier 
understanding of it that was present, for example, in the work of Georg Lukács.25 
Following this line of thinking, critical realism aims to offer an educational experience 
that is meaningful for students: one that empowers them to face, and if necessary 
challenge, the structural conditions underpinning their shared existence. 
 
Unlike other schools of thought in contemporary educational research, critical realism 
has thus aimed to integrate diverse critical approaches to education that, since the 1970s 
and the emergence of the ‘new sociology of education’, have cross-examined long held 
views about the content of educational programmes, modes of teaching, and individual 
expectations of and from students in multiple ways.26 The main contribution of critical 
realism to this trajectory of critical engagements with education has been its insistence 
on the importance of remaining acutely aware of structure. This insistence has helped 
to ensure that the richer view of subjectivity associated with standpoint theory, for 
example, is not taken as an invitation to assume that inter-subjective communication 
and learning are impossible, or that a revalidation of universal truths is needed in order 
to resolve contemporary uncertainties or issues associated with global inequality, 
radical diversity or processes of differentiation. As Sue Clegg has put it:  
 
One of the great advantages of the critical realist perspective is that it recognizes 
the irreducible hermeneutic moment in the social sciences through its 
elaboration of the transformative nature of social action and the absolute 






                                               
25 G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness (MIT Press, 1971). 
26 See for example: R. Sharp and A. Green, Education and Social Control (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1975); Michael Young, Knowledge and Control (Collier-Macmillan, 1971); A. Pollard, ‘Towards a 
sociology of learning in primary schools’ in S. J. Ball (ed), The Routledge Falmer Reader in Sociology 
of Education (Routledge Falmer, 2004). 
27 S. Clegg, ‘Evidence-based practice in educational research: a critical realist critique of systematic 
review’ (2005) 26(3) British Journal of Sociology of Education 415, 421. 
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II. Towards an emancipatory approach to agency and structure 
 
As we saw above, one of the main challenges that has emerged from critical realism is 
that of understanding ‘how adult learning is embedded in and constituted by the cultural 
and social relations of power that comprise the learning experience.’28 For critical 
realist authors such as Niewolny and Wilson, this should result in a (re)orientation of 
the learning experience based on the ‘recursivity’ of power in human systems of 
learning and knowing. The aim, here, is to draw attention to the way in which human 
learning experience is not just an expression of power structures but also a means of 
challenging them. According to critical realists, this attention to the co-constituted and 
potentially emancipatory relationship between agency and structure is often ‘missing 
from current interpretations of learning in and with context’.29 Here the idea of ‘context’ 
– often just understood as that of a particular individual or a particular situation – is 
extremely important because it has come to operate as a kind of shorthand for the 
broader, more comprehensive lessons of the ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences. 
Responding to this, standpoint theory, committed as it is to approaching and teaching 
people from and within their particular ‘contexts’, has become a common (if on 
occasion misunderstood) solution in debates on education and educational research. 
 
In order to move away from these potentially narrow readings of social reality and 
individual’s place in the world, Niewolny and Wilson have proposed using Miriam 
Zukas’ conceptualisation of ‘context’ in higher education.30 For them, Zukas’ reading 
offers a productive way to think about how educators can address – can contextualise 
– the interaction between structure and agency in their classrooms and curricula. 
According to Zukas: 
 
If we conceptualize pedagogy and pedagogic learning as the interpretation of 
persons and contexts, we can avoid these arguments between structure and 
agency and understand that individual teachers embody the historical, cultural, 
economic and political contexts for education. But they are not just ciphers for 
                                               
28 Niewolny and Wilson, ‘What happened to the promise?’, 32.  
29 Ibid, 33. Emphasis added. 
30 M. Zukas, ‘Pedagogic learning in pedagogic workplace: Educators’ lifelong learning and learning 
features’ (2006) 2(3) International Journal of Pedagogies and Learning 71. 
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structure; they also embody their own histories, politics, values and so on and 
in turn produce those educational contexts through their day to day work.31 
 
Niewolny and Wilson believe that this approach, and the critical self-reflexivity that it 
invites all stakeholders in the education process to embrace, can help educators gain a 
more comprehensive view of the learning environment and its possibilities. Teachers, 
students and the world that surrounds them, individually and collectively, are brought 
into conversation with each other in a way that makes it possible to understand what 
type of knowledge is relevant. Relevance here is not simply a quest for clarifying a 
canon – ‘the canon’ – that must be transmitted in order to fulfil a pre-set series of ideas, 
important historical facts or essential lessons. Although teaching ‘the canon’ remains 
important, according to critical realism the fundamental point of education is 
constructing a learning experience cognisant of the power dynamics that inform 
teachers’ and students’ interactions, and that condition the world they want to 
understand and intervene in. If the task is to offer an academic experience that is 
meaningful at the two levels of acquiring and mobilising knowledge, it is then 
extremely important to keep the dynamics that sustain interactions of structure and 
agency at the forefront of curriculum design and classroom interactions.  
 
This comprehensive approach to structure and agency in education is key for Edwards. 
Through a detailed account of standpoint theory and a call to recuperate the critical 
elements of that tradition, she argues for attention to the dialectical relationship that 
exists ‘between the subjective experience of the knower and the prevailing (mind-
independent) natural and social world.’ 32  According to Edwards, this dialectical 
relationship should frame both teaching and the search for knowledge more generally. 
If this suggestion is followed, in her view, ‘any school curriculum must be designed to 
require pupils’ evaluation of knowledge since they must engage critically with pre-
existing structures’ – and the same, critical realists would contend, goes for higher 
education curricula. 33  In this context claims for the neutrality of knowledge – in 
addition to claims concerning its universality, mentioned above – are hypotheses that 
should be subject to multiple processes of cross-examination. Again, this is not a denial 
                                               
31 Ibid, 71, cited in Niewolny and Wilson, ‘What happened to the promise?’, 33. 
32 Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity’, 173. 
33 Ibid. 
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of the possibility of objectivity. It is instead the thoughtful outcome of a long series of 
conversations about the nature of knowledge, the function of education vis-à-vis 
structural conditions, and the power that, together, these conditions assert over the 
world and students. As Edwards puts it, ‘[g]iven [students’] standpoint, or structural 
location, neutrality in knowing is impossible because the objects of their knowledge 
include the value-laden social structures and conventions of which they are a part.’34  
 
This attention to the effects of structure both on the world (out there) and on students 
(in the classroom) speaks of a shared preoccupation, among critical thinkers, with the 
role of past as well as present structural forces on human action. To give an example 
from the sphere of history, Eric Hobsbawm has explained, in his discussion of the work 
of Pierre Bourdieu, how ‘the past constitutes the soil in which the present’s roots are 
plunged, forming the basis for our capacity to understand our own times and to act upon 
them.’35 Hobsbawm here is extending, of course, Marx’s understanding of the tight 
interaction between history, structure and agency. According to Marx, ‘[m]en make 
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given, and transmitted from the past.’36 
 
Keeping in mind this tradition of critical thinking and its emphasis on appreciating the 
broader temporal and geographical forces underpinning social life, objectivity should 
not be then rejected when we approach the task of education. On the contrary, paying 
attention to structure should enable us to bring to classrooms an awareness about the 
partiality of knowledge and about knowledge production. This examination of the 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge requires that students must be able – and be 
required – to exercise critical objectivity, employ analytical skills, and display a 
capacity to judge between competing accounts of reality and legitimacy.37 Rather than 
                                               
34 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
35 E. Hobsbawm, ‘Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Sociology and Social History’ (2016) 101 The New Left 
Review 37, 39. 
36 K. Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ in D. McLellan (ed), Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings (Oxford University Press, 2000), 329. On this line of thinking, in particular in terms of its 
connection to the agency-structure relation, see: Alex Callinicos, Making History: Agency, Structure, 
and Change in Social Theory (Brill, 2nd ed., 2004). 
37 On the crucial role of these critical skills – understood in terms of (self)reflexivity – in our times of 
late modernity, see: M. Archer, The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012).  
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hindering objectivity, questioning the universality or impartiality of knowledge can 
thus reveal structurally distorted patterns of knowing and the crystallisation of 
economic, political and cultural inequalities based on biased ideas. Only by making 
knowledge strange, and thus bringing the relationship between knowledge, structure 
and agency to the surface, is it possible to invite students to challenge social structures 
that are based ‘upon a skewed perspective of reality.’38 
 
Critical learning and social change are, in this sense, both analytical objetives and 
operative aims in critical realism. This is particularly clear when we think about 
education in contexts in which students are from overtly disadvantaged backgrounds. 
In such contexts, the structural biases impinging on students’ capacities to interact with 
the world on an equal footing are impossible to ignore. Similarly, students’ capacity to 
reframe and mobilise their agency in order to challenge structural conditions is limited. 
It is therefore necessary to introduce curricula that can generate transversal analysis and 
skills, thereby empowering students to read structure and agency as part of a single unit 
– a unit they can understand and, hopefully, challenge.39 Again, as Edwards puts it:  
 
[t]he experience of a subjugated group within a particular social structure is a 
necessary starting point for interrogating reality in as much as this group is 
likely to pose questions that cannot arise in those groups whose lives are 
structured from a position of material advantage. This is not to say that the 
perspectives of working-class [students] are necessarily valid or objective 
accounts; rather, it is to say only that a critical engagement with reality must 
take the perspectives and differential power relations within different structural 
locations into account on the journey towards stronger objectivity of knowing.40 
 
Evaluating educational outcomes with a critical realist approach therefore implies a 
rather different set of questions from those that other perspectives favour. Given the 
critical realist attention to the interaction of structure and agency, the objective of 
evaluating a curriculum should not be based on a traditional additive model of evidence. 
                                               
38 Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity’, 173. 
39  On the importance of understanding structure and agency as part of one unit, see: T. Mitchell, 
‘Everyday Metaphors of Power’ (1990) 19(5) Theory and Society 545. 
40 Edwards, ‘Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity’, 174. Emphasis in the original. 
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As Clegg has made clear, traditional models of evaluation rely on a systematic review 
of positive or negative results based on benchmarks that do not necessarily take into 
account the way in which knowledge is constructed or how it could and perhaps should 
be challenged. From a critical realist perspective, a model of educational evaluation 
would instead ‘define evidence as work that can give insight into the structures, powers, 
generative mechanisms and tendencies that help us understand the concrete world 
experience.’41 This is particularly crucial in our current, highly interconnected world, 
in which individual circumstances are determined by a myriad of political, economic, 
social and environmental forces, some of them immediate in historical and geographical 
terms, others far removed in time and space. And although this global condition has 
already come to be understood as the new common sense, presentism, individualism 
and localism continue to stubbornly guide teaching and evaluation methods, including 
in legal education.42 
 
The acute attention to structure and agency that resides at the core of critical realism is 
thus indicative of its potential to inform the design and delivery of education 
programmes that are meaningful for students and for the broader community, especially 
as we face the ever more intricate global order of the twenty-first century. This is 
important, once again, because broader power dynamics often tend to be neglected in 
teaching environments. A critical realist approach departs, instead, from the assumption 
that ‘adults learn embedded in and mediated from historical issues of struggle and 
resistance.’43 Keeping this as our starting point, it might then be possible to begin the 
task of outlining an educational landscape in which students are enabled to learn, 




                                               
41 Clegg, ‘Evidence-based practice in educational research’, 421. 
42 On the long discussions about the need to embrace a more global and plural approach in legal 
education, and adopting through this a new ‘common sense’, see for example, B. de Sousa Santos, 
Towards a New Legal Common Sense (Cambridge University Press, 2002). See on the ongoing need to 
promote a more global approach to legal education, P. Zumbansen, ‘What lies Before, Behind and 
Beneath a Case? Five Minutes on Transnational Lawyering and the Consequences for Legal Education’ 
in S. Van Praagh and H. Dedek (eds.), Stateless Law: Evolving Boundaries of a Discipline (Ashgate, 
2014). 
43 Niewolny and Wilson, ‘What happened to the promise?’, 30. 
44 Ibid. 
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III. Teaching (another) international law  
 
Since the early 1990s, scholars working in the field of international law have witnessed 
the emergence of several distinct strands of critical international legal thought. 
Feminism, post-colonialism, critical theory, political economy, critical historiography 
and psychoanalysis, among many other bodies of critical scholarship, have informed 
this diversification of international law scholarship – a field that had long been confined 
to the strict study of treaties, state practice and the workings of international 
institutions.45 Today it is possible to argue that a lively and diverse conversation is 
occurring under the banner of critical approaches to international law, which in itself is 
organised according to various self-constituted movements.46 Current publications and 
conferences associated with Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL); 
feminist approaches to international law; heterodox approaches to international law; 
international law, colonialism and imperialism; and Marxist international law are just 
some examples.47  
 
Like scholars working on educational research from a critical realist point of view, 
critical scholars of international law have debated the relationship between structure 
and agency for many years.48 Although not quite so overt as in critical realism, a 
recurring theme across critical international legal scholarship is the resilient presence 
                                               
45 See for example how M. Koskenniemi narrates this shift: ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years 
Later’ (2009) 20(1) The European Journal of International Law 7. 
46  See as examples of the diversity of conversations in contemporary (critical) international legal 
scholarship, the chapters included in the edited collections: A. Orford, International Law and its Others 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009); J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion 
to International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012); P. Singh and B. Mayer (eds), Critical 
International Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism, and Transnationalism (Oxford University Press, 
2014); A. Orford and F. Hoffman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
47 On the object of these different movements and approaches, see for example: J. Beckett, ‘Critical 
International Legal Theory’ (Oxford Bibliographies, Oxford University Press, 2012) 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-
0007.xml (last accessed: 27 January 2019). 
48 See for example, M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law: 20 Years Later’ (2009) 20(1) 
European Journal of International Law 7; M. Koskenniemi, ‘What is Critical Research in International 
Law? Celebrating Structuralism’ (2016) 29(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 727. A similar 
attention has been given to questions of structure in heterodox approaches to economics. Economics is a 
field in which the turn to agency over recent decades has been markedly pronounced. This over-reliance 
on (abstract) individual volition and choice, embodied in the figure of the homo-economicus, has been 
contested systematically by heterodox economists and neo-structuralists. See for example: S. Fleetwood 
(ed), Critical Realism in Economics: Development and Debate (Routledge, 2004); A. Fischer, ‘The End 
of Peripheries? On the Enduring Relevance of Structuralism for Understanding Contemporary Global 
Development’ (2015) 46(4) Development and Change 700. 
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of structural biases and distributional patterns of economic and political power and 
disposition in the international (legal) order. Importantly, critical international legal 
scholars have argued that these structural biases are not external to the field but are 
actually constitutive of and constituted by international law. Antony Anghie, a leading 
figure in Third World Approaches to International Law, has argued, for example, that 
the modern international legal system was founded on a ‘dynamic of difference’ (a 
structural bias of differentiation) established during the colonial period and based on a 
European standard of civilisation.49  For Anghie this dynamic of difference helped 
institutionalise international asymmetries of power between colonial powers and 
colonised subjects, which enabled multiple forms of cultural, political and economic 
exploitation. In his reading, and as I put it earlier recalling Foucault, this dynamic of 
difference presented itself, and continues to present itself, as a naturalised arrangement 
of power, a natural order of things. In Anghie’s words:  
 
I use the term ‘dynamic of difference’ to denote, broadly, the endless process of 
creating a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and 
civilized and the other as ‘particular’ and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the 
gap by developing techniques to normalize the aberrant society. My argument 
is that this dynamic animated the development of many of the central doctrines 
of international law – most particularly, sovereignty doctrine. [This] dynamic is 
[also] self-sustaining and indeed … endless; each act of arrival reveals further 
horizons, each act of bridging further differences that international law must 
seek to overcome. It is in this way that international law extends itself 
horizontally, to encompass the entire globe and, once this is achieved, vertically, 
within each society, to ensure the emergence of civilized states.50 
 
This passage suggests how the processes examined in Anghie’s reading of the 
international legal order’s emergence during the colonial period continue to inform the 
                                               
49 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). See also, L. Obregón, ‘The Civilized and the Uncivilized’ in B. Fassbender and A. Peters 
(eds), Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
50 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, 4. 
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structuring of (our ostensibly post-colonial) global order – a position reflected in the 
work of many other contemporary critical internal legal scholars.51 
 
Critical international law scholars have paid similar attention to agency and, more 
specifically, to how structure and agency are co-constituted categories. For example, 
critical historian of international law, Rose Parfitt has challenged the tendency to view 
different levels of international legal agency – or ‘personality’ to use the technical term 
– as detached both from one another, and from certain normative assumptions that 
silently determine the way in which material resources are allocated by the global legal 
order.52 According to Parfitt, the legal agency or personality of states is conditioned on 
their commitment to reproducing a particular kind of agency among the individuals 
within their borders. In her view, the mechanism of conditionality that links these two 
levels of ‘free’ and ‘equal’ agency together has, since the ‘discovery’ of the ‘Americas’ 
and the earliest incarnations of international law, been the seemingly universal and 
innocuous standard of ‘government’ (which all states must possess, in addition to 
territory and population, in order to be recognised as such by the international 
community). Far from being normatively empty, she argues, the idea of government is 
replete with normative content and hence with non-negotiable, externally enforceable 
instructions as to how a community should organise its political, economic, cultural and 
administrative affairs. These instructions continue to be propagated today through the 
institutional and normative logics evident in the operation, for example, of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and in the articulation of new international 
doctrines, such as the Responsibility to Protect, according to which states have a duty 
to intervene in the affairs of other states if the latter are deemed ‘unwilling or unable’ 
to protect their populations. 
                                               
51 See e.g.: J. L. Beard, The Political Economy of Desire: Law, International Law, Development, and the 
Nation State (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); B. S. Chimni, International Law and World Order 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2017); M. Fakhri, Sugar and the Making of International trade Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014); R. Falk, B. Rajagopal and J. Stevens (eds), International Law and 
the Third World: Reshaping Justice (Routledge, 2007); A. Orford, International Authority and the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2011); S. Pahuja, Decolonising International 
Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press, 
2011); B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance (Cambridge, 2003). 
52  See especially: R. Parfitt, The Process of International Legal Reproduction: Inequality, 
Historiography, Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2019). See also, R. Parfitt, ‘Theorizing 
Recognition and International Personality’ in A. Orford and F. Hoffman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Theory of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016); R. S. Parfitt, ‘The Anti-Neutral Suit: 
International Legal Futurists, 1914–2017’ (2017) 5(1) London Review of International Law 87. 
– L.Eslava, forthcoming in The Law Teacher – 
 18 
 
Though in principle these international normative and institutional developments could 
be understood as noble in their intentions, once unpacked and subject to a structure and 
agency analysis, doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect or the promotion of ‘the 
rule of law’ are shown to enclose assumptions and operative logics that reinforce the 
idea that certain states and certain peoples (often located in the Global South) are in 
need of salvation via sporadic military, economic and/or legal interventions.53 Little is 
said in these cases about the urgency of substantively reformulating the international 
economic order, which in most instances is the ‘structural’ source of internal conflict 
and weak institutional arrangements in the South, and the adversities suffered by the 
poor or disadvantaged of the North.54 Critical international scholars have thus, like 
critical realists, come to examine how these dynamics at the international level often 
affect the daily internal motions of nation-states and the everyday lives of their citizens, 
shaping both, persistently and profoundly.55 
 
Although critical international legal scholars continue to advance and expand the 
arguments I have just sketched briefly here in relation to the interaction between 
structure and agency, it is still difficult to find a clear articulation of how these 
conversations have impacted, or should impact, on the teaching of international law. 
This lack of pedagogical reflection is, in many important ways, an outcome of the still 
commonly held view of law, both domestic and international, as a technical field of 
expertise, driven by positive norms and impersonal and apolitical interventions. While 
                                               
53 As a classic examples of this critical reading of the dark side of good intentions in international law, 
see especially: M. Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42(1) 
Harvard International Law Journal 201; D. Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing 
International Humanitarianism (Princeton University Press, 2005). On rule of law promotion, see: T. 
Krever, ‘The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World Bank’s 
Development Model’ (2011) 52(1) Harvard International Law Journal 288. 
54 Linarelli, Salomon, Sornarajah, The Misery of International Law, 8–18. 
55 In my own work I have tried to contribute to this line of enquiry on the ground-level, everyday 
constitutive power of international law. See for example: L. Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The 
Everyday Operation of International Law and Development (2015, Cambridge University Press); L. 
Eslava, ‘Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of International Law’ (2014) 2(1) London 
Review of International Law 3; L. Eslava, ‘The Materiality of International Law: Violence, History and 
Joe Sacco’s The Great War’ (2017) 5(1) London Review of International Law 49; L. Eslava, ‘The Moving 
Location of Empire: Indirect Rule, International Law, and the Bantu Kinema Experiment’ (2018) 31(3) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 539; L. Eslava and L Buchely, ‘Security and Development? A Story 
about Petty Crime, the Petty State and its Petty Law’ (2019) 67 Revista de Estudios Sociales 40. 
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this could be seen as the general trend in legal education,56 however, one group of 
critical international legal academics has begun to think through the question of how 
the larger conversation about the relationship between structure and agency in the field 
should impact the teaching of their subject.57 
 
For instance, Juan Amaya-Castro, Hilary Charlesworth, Madelaine Chiam, Anne 
Orford, Sundhya Pahuja, James Parker, Christine Schwöbel-Patel and Gerry Simpson 
have all explored how the teaching of international law can be more attentive to the 
relationship between structure and agency in the global order. Orford has explained, for 
example, that she is interested in thinking ‘about what [international] lawyers are doing 
when they reproduce intervention stories: the characters and relations with others they 
create, the communities they offer to constitute, and some of the effects of such 
actions.’58 In so doing, Orford attempts ‘to provide a broader insight into the way in 
which law operates through embodied human beings.’59 For Orford, this enquiry into 
the constitutive power of international law – constitutive power in regards to both the 
broader world and international lawyers themselves – should enable an interrogation of 
‘the ways in which lawyers are disciplined’; a process ‘rarely explored, largely because 
                                               
56 See as important exceptions of this trend, in particular in terms of legal education: D. Kennedy, ‘Legal 
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy’ (1982) 32(4) Journal of Legal Education 591; C. Menkel-
Meadow, ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or “The Fem-Crits Go to 
Law School”’ (1988) 38(1) Journal of Legal Education 61; J. L. Anderson, ‘Law School Enters the 
Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies’ (2004) 54(2) Journal of Legal Education 201; G. Sandrino-
Glasser, ‘Latcrit Theory, Critical Legal Education, and Board Diversity Reflections of an Afro-Cuban 
Law Professor’ (2007) 8 Rutgers Race & the Law Review 199; M. Thornton, ‘Legal Education in the 
Corporate University’ (2014) 10 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 19. 
57  See for example: J. M. Amaya-Castro, ‘Teaching International Law: Both Everywhere and 
Somewhere’ in J. C. Saínz-Borgo, H. Gudmunsdottir and G. Gudmunsdottir (eds), Liber Amicorum in 
Honour of a Modern Renaissance Man Gudmundur Eiríksson (O.P. Jindal Global University and 
University of Peace, 2017) 521; H. Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) 
65(3) Modern Law Review 377; Madelaine Chiam, Sundhya Pahuja and James Parker, ‘How to Run a 
Writing Workshop? On the Cultivation of Scholarly Ethics in “Global” Legal Education’ (2018) 44(2) 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 289; A. Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of 
International Lawyers’ (1998) 19 Australia Yearbook of International Law 1;G. Simpson, ‘On the magic 
mountain: teaching public international law’ (1999) 10(1) European Journal of International Law 70; C. 
Schwöbel-Patel, ‘“I’d like to Learn What Hegemony Means”: Teaching International Law from a Critical 
Angle’ (2013) 2 Recht En Methode 67; C. Schwöbel-Patel, ‘Teaching International Law Critically: 
Critical Pedagogy and Bildung as Orientations for Learning and Teaching’ in B. van Klink and U. de 
Vries (eds), Academic Learning in Law: Theoretical Positions, Teaching Experiments and Learning 
Experiences (Edward Elgar, 2016) 99. See also the excellent bibliography of international law and 
teaching edited by Christine Schwöbel-Patel, ‘Teaching International Law’ (Oxford Bibliographies, 
Oxford University Press, 2018) http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0166.xml (last accessed: 27 January 2019). 
58 Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism’, 4. 
59 Ibid. 
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the protocols of scholarly writing in disciplines like law have for a long time required 
that the “author” be absent from the text.’60 The process of disciplining international 
lawyers becomes of the utmost importance, however, ‘if we want to analyse the subject 
positions… offered to international lawyers, and to consider why such subject positions 
are appealing’ and what kinds of narratives and power dynamics they reproduce.61 
 
These authors suggest that bringing together, in the classroom, the insights generated 
by academic research into how structural conditions underpin the construction of the 
world at collective and individual levels can help students become more attuned to the 
broader workings of international law. For Charlesworth it is therefore crucial to move 
beyond the typical type of training students receive in international law, which she 
describes as ‘a discipline of crisis’.62 In her view, such training – oriented around events 
such as the ‘Kosovo Crisis’, the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ or the ‘Sudetenland Crisis’, for 
example – encourages students ‘to concentrate on a single event or series of events’, 
which often means missing the larger picture, including longer-term trends and 
structural problems.63 The challenge, Charlesworth argues, is to conceive of a style of 
pedagogical practice that is capable of revealing international law’s operation on, in 
and through the minutiae of our daily lives, and how this is as important, in a structural 
sense, as its much more visible problem-solving role in the sphere of international 
emergencies. Indeed, she concludes, we should also ‘consider our own personal and 
professional investment in crises’ and ‘analyse the way we exercise power, and who 
wins and who loses in this operation’. In doing so – and, by extension, in training our 
students to do so – we will give ourselves the opportunity to ‘undermine that 
pleasurable sense of internationalist virtue that comes with being an international 
lawyer’ and perhaps also to ‘contribute something to countering the injustices of 
                                               
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. On the reproduction of narratives and power dynamics through the language of (international) 
human rights and international criminal law, see for example: R. Knox, ‘Marxist Approaches to Human 
Rights Law’ in D. Gonzalez-Salzberg and L. Hodson (eds), Research Methodologies for International 
Human Rights Law: Beyond the Traditional Paradigm (Routledge, 2019); Sara Kendall & Sarah 
Nouwen, ‘Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap Between Juridified 
and Abstract Victimhood’ (2014) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 235. 
62 Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ 392. 
63 Ibid, 384. On how international law is operationalised in particular ways, and at particular moments of 
‘rupture’, in a way that foregrounds expertise and sovereign rights and backgrounds resistance, see also 
C. Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and International Law 
(Oxford University Press), 244–250.  
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everyday life’.64 According to Charlesworth, Orford and their colleagues, attending 
closely to the deep and widespread connection between structure and agency, and to its 
impact on everyday arrangements of power, can increase students’ ability to challenge 
unequal global patterns of distribution and accumulation, and think about how such 
patterns affect them and are, indeed, reproduced by them.65 
 
These reflections on how to teach in a way that is analytically much more acute suggest 
that critical scholars in the field of international law have been advancing, perhaps 
inadvertently, a very similar set of insights to those of critical realism.66 The pending 
challenge is to bring these two areas of work more closely together – an exercise which 
promises a more grounded learning experience for students in higher education. 
Running in parallel is the possibility of offering students access to a more emancipatory 
body of knowledge – a particularly important task given the many challenges we are 
experiencing in our complex world.  
 
As Schwöbel-Patel has made clear, this rethinking of international legal pedagogy is a 
particularly pressing task when we consider that international law continues to be taught 
largely ‘in a way which aims to inculcate a language of expertise employed in 
international legal organizations.’ 67  Although powerful in its own right, this 
naturalisation into expertise – accompanied by law’s growing institutional isolation 
from other branches of the social sciences and humanities – reflects an educational 
environment that is increasingly dominated by market pressures. In this context, legal 
education becomes a privileged site within which to enforce ‘the cardinal features of 
neoliberalism’: ‘individualism, competition, growth, and an idea of the guaranteeing of 
freedom through free markets and trade.’68 Leaving the way international law is taught 
unquestioned implies then not only that we will allow such often unspoken background 
assumptions to permeate our classrooms uncontested. At the same time, and perhaps 
                                               
64 Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’, 389. 
65 In this sense, on the importance of paying attention to the reproduction of slow and everyday violence 
as a result of moments of crisis, see: C. Peevers, ‘USAID Rice–Haiti’ in J. Hohmann and D. Joyce (eds.), 
International Law's Objects (Oxford University Press, 2018). 
66 Critical realism has also been very useful in other fields of international inquiry, for example in 
international relations. See for example: B. Gruffydd Jones, Explaining Global Poverty: A Critical 
Realist Approach (Routledge, 2009). 
67 Schwöbel-Patel, ‘Teaching International Law Critically’, 99. 
68 Ibid, 108. 
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even more importantly, failing to question our pedagogy implies that international law 
courses will continue to reproduce a particular cultural hegemony that undermines the 
future of our students – and the future of those whom their professional activities will 




With their close examination of the interplay between structure and agency in 
education, critical realist scholars have been tackling one of the most fundamental 
themes in the social sciences and higher education. In their insistence on keeping this 
interplay in mind when designing educational curricula, such scholars have been able 
to bring together different critical approaches to research in adult education that have 
evolved since the 1970s, while remaining both analytically sophisticated and politically 
committed.  
 
In this article I have drawn attention to the salience and political traction of critical 
realism when it comes to thinking critically about the international legal order and the 
teaching of international law today. It would be beyond the scope of this essay to give 
a detailed account of my own practice as a teacher, but let me close with the observation 
that critical realism’s explicit engagement with structure and agency has given me a 
sharper set of tools with which to lay bare – in my syllabi and teaching – some of the 
ways in which international law, with its imperial history and postcolonial agonies, 
forms part of our shared ‘web of life’.70 Critical realism has clarified to me how, if we 
are to undo the legacy of international law’s imperial past and neo-imperial present and 
build another international law from this exercise, our first step must be to address the 
ways in which its supposedly ‘historical’ structures and subject formations are still with 
us today. As Bourdieu puts it, ‘the present is not the temporal present, it is what is still 
sufficiently alive to be the object of struggles.’71 In our anthropocenic times of climate 
change, intensifying global capitalism and escalating inequalities, which have given 
rise to new challenges to sedimented racial and gender relations, and of increasingly 
                                               
69 Ibid. 
70 Here I am consciously playing with the title of J. Moore’s book Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology 
and Accumulation of Capital (Verso, 2015). 
71 P. Bourdieu and R. Chartier, The Sociologist and the Historian (Polity Press, 2015), 16. 
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radical calls for the decolonization of (among other things) universities and curricula, 
this insight is impossible to ignore.72 As some of the critical international legal scholars 
mentioned above have stressed in their work, thinking about international law in the 
longue durée, and in terms of the impact of its past on our present, is both necessary 
and urgent. 
 
A historical approach that is attentive to continuities and discontinuities, and conscious 
of the interplay between structure and agency, has indeed proved to be a powerful 
pedagogical tool in my own teaching. It has given me a way of situating my students 
within the history of the international legal order and of showing them the crucial role 
of international law’s doctrines in the making and remaking of our world, past and 
present. Once my students understand themselves as historical subjects, whose 
concerns, ambitions, privileges and identities are shaped, explicitly and implicitly, by 
international law and its doctrines, the ground – the broader ‘context’, to use the 
language examined above – is laid for them to engage with international law and with 
the world in more productive ways.73 In Bourdieu’s words, ‘we are born determined 
and we have a small chance of ending up free.’74  He insists that there is always, 
however, a place for rational enquiry and ‘rational utopianism’.75 
 
My undergraduate and postgraduate courses, for example those on Public International 
Law, International Human Rights Law, and International Law and Development, have 
each been enriched by attention to how large, historically formed structural conditions 
come to interact with people’s agentic possibilities, including the agency of my own 
                                               
72  On how international law has been structured in such a way that it systematically reinforces 
environmental harm, see: U. Natarajan and K. Khoday, ‘Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking 
International Law’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 573. On the relation between 
international law, economic exploitation and race, see especially: R. Knox, ‘Valuing race? Stretched 
Marxism and the logic of imperialism’ (2016) 4(1) London Review of International Law 81. On the call 
for decolonizing higher education, see from my own institution, Kent Law School, the ‘Decolonizing the 
Curriculum Manifesto’ put together by our undergraduate law students with the support of Suhraiya 
Jivraj: https://decoloniseukc.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/decolonising-the-curriculum-manifesto-final-
2.pdf  
73 On the pedagogical importance of grounding the ‘everywhereness’ of international law and its effects, 
see: Amaya-Castro, ‘Teaching International Law: Both Everywhere and Somewhere’. 
74 Bourdieu and Chartier, The Sociologist and the Historian, 20. 
75 Ibid, 33. 
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students.76 In my Public International Law classes this approach has helped me to 
articulate more organically the historical and doctrinal aspects of the discipline, making 
topics such as the doctrine of sources or the law of treaties more relevant to my students. 
Thanks to this approach, they realise how the historical forces that came to confirm 
certain sources as sources of international law and not others today play a massive role 
in shaping the place they themselves occupy in the international order, and the room 
they have, or do not have, to challenge issues that matters for them enormously – for 
example climate change, corporate misbehaviour or the situation of indigenous 
communities in the developing and the developed worlds. My International Human 
Rights Law syllabus now emphasises the way in which the global architecture of human 
rights has come to constitute, especially over the last three decades, particular subjects 
in the world – for example, the citizen, the woman, the worker, the refugee or the poor 
– who enjoy certain specific rights and not others. Engaging the ‘canon’ of international 
human rights law through this idea of subject formation has made it more attractive to 
my students, not because it reaffirms the usual liberatory aura of this area of law, but 
because it gives them a way to engage with it as a sphere of contingent practices that 
we should worry about, and transform if needed, in order to produce those types of 
change that we desire. In the case of International Law and Development, being more 
explicit about the interaction between structure and agency, both in the broader world 
and within the classroom, has been extremely valuable in the creation of patterns of 
readings, lessons and in-class exercises that systematically invite students to explore 
their place within the kind of global order that the development project – and before 
that, the ‘civilising mission’ and the idea of progress – has produced, with its centres 
and peripheries, its underdeveloped and developed communities, and its many Norths 
in the South, and Souths in the North. 
 
Whether they come from Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, Latin 
America or the Pacific, my students tend to emerge from these modules with a renewed 
sense of the importance of international law and, significantly, with a stronger sense of 
existing in a shared world. Importantly, the lesson they take with them is not to run 
away from a field so deeply imbricated in global structures of power, but that we must 
                                               
76 I share my syllabi of my courses on Public International Law, International Human Rights Law, and 
International Law and Development, as well as my other courses, on my Academia page: 
https://kent.academia.edu/LuisEslava.  
– L.Eslava, forthcoming in The Law Teacher – 
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enagage more closely ‘with and against’ international law’s frames, and its long doing 
and undoing of us.77 Approaching international law as part of our shared existence, as 
something that we need to wrestle with, my students remember what Bhaskar said in a 
conversation with Alex Callinicos back in 2003:  
 
[W]e’re all bound together in one unity. The really important thing about this 
unity is that my freedom within it depends on your freedom, because I can’t be 
free while you’re unfree. Why? There are so many arguments for this. At a 
cosmic level, you’re a part of me... At a simpler level, let’s look at the empirical 
fact of global interconnectedness. Does anyone believe they can escape from 
the consequences of global warming, from the consequences of the generalized 
panic and hysteria that has set in around the events which we call 9/11? Or does 
anyone believe they can avoid the consequences of a chronic and growing 
indebtedness in the third world, or the increased privatization and liberalization 
that the aggressive imperialist policies pursued through the World Bank and the 
IMF impose on third world countries? We’re all bound up together. We sink or 
swim together.78 
                                               
77 On teaching ‘with and against’ international law, see: K. Rittich, ‘A View from the Left: International 
Economic Law’ (2006–2007) 31 New York University Review of Law & Social Change 671. 
78 R. Bhaskar and A. Callinicos, ‘Marxism and Critical Realism’ (2003) 1(2) Journal of Critical Realism 
89, 113–114. 
 
